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‡ Abstract 
 
We establish the entry-deterring role of vertical contracts in a setting that does not rely on asymmetric 
information, the exclusivity of the incumbent’s contracts, limits on distribution channels, or restrictions 
on the ability to renegotiate contracts in case of entry. The optimal contract we describe is a three-part 
quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to the downstream firm and a 
marginal wholesale price below the incumbent’s marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. 
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Nous établissons le rôle de dissuasion à l'entrée des contrats verticaux dans un cadre qui n’est pas basé 
sur l'information asymétrique, sur l'exclusivité des contrats de la firme en exercice, sur les limites des 
canaux de distribution, ou sur des restrictions sur la capacité de renégocier les contrats en cas de entrée. 
Le contrat optimal décrit est un contrat avec remise sur quantité en trois parties qui implique le 
versement d'une indemnité à la firme en aval et un prix de gros marginal inférieur au coût marginal de la 
firme en exercice pour les quantités suffisamment importantes. 
 
Mots clés: entrée, contrats verticaux, exclusivité, renégociation. 
 
Classification JEL: D21, L42. 1 Introduction
There is by now a large literature showing how an incumbent can deter e¢ cient entry by
acting strategically, such as through sunk costs or reputation e⁄ects.1 One strand of this
literature looks at entry deterrence through contracts. Many theories of entry deterrence in
this branch can be criticized since they rely on the incumbent o⁄ering contracts that are
not renegotiation proof in case the rival does enter, or where they are renegotiation proof,
rely on exclusive contracts which completely tie up the distribution options for the entrant
and are assumed costly to breach. Other theories that avoid such assumptions rely on the
use of asymmetric information between the di⁄erent parties. In this paper we provide a new
theory of credible entry deterrence that does not rely on asymmetric information, exclusive
contracts, limits in distribution channels, contracts that condition on entry, or there being
no contract negotiation following entry.
We consider a Bertrand environment in which the incumbent signs a contract with a
downstream ￿rm to keep out a more e¢ cient entrant. A key feature of the optimal vertical
contract we describe is quantity discounting or declining marginal prices. For low levels of
purchases, the downstream ￿rm purchases at a wholesale price set above the incumbent￿ s
marginal cost, thereby providing a way for the incumbent to extract the pro￿t of the down-
stream ￿rm. For purchases beyond some higher level, the downstream ￿rm purchases at a
wholesale price set below the incumbent￿ s marginal cost, thereby ensuring that in the face of
competition the downstream ￿rm will want to compete aggressively, constraining the rival￿ s
price without actually needing to sell anything itself. To prevent the entrant contracting with
the downstream ￿rm, the incumbent￿ s optimal contact has to leave the downstream ￿rm with
a rent equal to the entrant￿ s e¢ ciency pro￿t. This rent has to be paid to the downstream ￿rm
irrespective of the quantity purchased, i.e., it represents an allowance, known as a slotting
allowance in the context of retailing (see Foros and Kind, 2008).
We show a three-part contract (two linear parts and an allowance) is the simplest optimal
contract for credible entry-deterrence. A powerful feature of the optimal contract we discuss
1See Wilson (1992) for a survey.
1is that it allows the incumbent to indirectly condition its contract on entry. The non-linear
nature of the incumbent￿ s optimal contract exploits the fact the quantity purchased by the
downstream ￿rm will di⁄er depending on whether it faces competition or not. This avoids the
incumbent monopolist having to explicitly write a contingent contract in which its wholesale
price is lowered in case of entry.
Our theory is related to a substantial body of work that studies the commitment bene￿ts
of vertical contracts. A standard result in this literature is that manufacturers can soften
price competition if they can commit to contracts with retailers in which wholesale prices
are in￿ ated above cost. Examples of papers in this line include Bonanno and Vickers (1988),
Rey and Stiglitz (1995). We explore a previously overlooked entry deterring implication of
the commitment e⁄ects of vertical contracts if interbrand competition takes the homogenous
Bertrand form in which no such softening of competition is possible.2
Another mechanism to deter entry that has been studied in the literature is the use of
divisionalization, following the work of Schwartz and Thompson (1986). They establish that
an incumbent may deter an equally e¢ cient rival by creating independent competing divisions
that emulate the behavior of the rival and therefore do not allow it to recover its ￿xed cost
of entry. Their mechanism is akin to delegating production to competing downstream ￿rms
with a vertical contract in which the wholesale price is ￿xed at the incumbent￿ s marginal
cost of production (and pro￿ts recovered through a pro￿t sharing agreement). In our setting,
such an approach would not work given we assume the rival is more e¢ cient and there is
Bertrand competition. Nevertheless, the idea of committing downstream divisions or ￿rms
to be more aggressive to deter entry is related.
The issues of entry deterrence and renegotiation have also been considered in settings
that involve the presence of asymmetric information. Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that
including a provision for liquidated damages to be paid by the downstream ￿rm to upstream
￿rm if it switches to the entrant would e⁄ectively deter some e¢ cient entry. Dewatripont
2Etro (2010) shows more generally how the conclusions in this literature change dramatically when entry
is taken as endogenous rather that assumed away.
2(1988) presents an example where a principal competing with a third party can bene￿t from
the possibility of signing public contracts with her agent, even though secret renegotiation is
possible. Caillaud et al. (1994) analyze precommitment e⁄ects in a more general contracting
game between vertical structures when public contracts can always be secretly renegotiated.
Our theory also relates to the literature on exclusive contracting. In case the incum-
bent can make its initial contract exclusive, it no longer has to o⁄er a positive rent to the
downstream ￿rm and the incumbent can attain the full monopoly pro￿t while still pre-
serving renegotiation-proofness. Thus our theory relates to a literature studying exclusive
dealing between upstream and downstream ￿rms in which the exclusive contract involves a
price commitment (see Simpson and Wickelgren, 2001, Stefanadis, 1998, Erutku, 2006, and
Appendix B of Fumagalli and Motta, 2006). For instance, Fumagalli and Motta show the
incumbent manufacturer will commit to a low wholesale price (to deter entry), extracting
the surplus enjoyed by downstream ￿rms paying this low wholesale price through an upfront
fee which it receives when the exclusive deal is signed. This enables the incumbent to deter
entry although at a low price, meaning renegotiation would always be pro￿table. Our re-
sults imply the incumbent can do better, obtaining the full monopoly pro￿t with a contract
involving quantity discounting but which does not require an upfront fee or a restriction
ruling out renegotiation of the initial contract. Our results also suggest that the exclusivity
in such deals, while lowering the cost of entry deterrence, may not be strictly necessary to
deter entry.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The basic model setup is given in Section
2. Our main ￿ndings are derived in Section 3. Section 4 then considers several extensions,
highlighting the role played by the various key assumptions. Section 5 brie￿ y concludes.
2 Benchmark model
We focus on a model in which ￿rms sell an identical good and set prices (i.e. homogenous
Bertrand competition). There is an incumbent ￿rm, which we will denote as I, which faces
3constant marginal costs of cI. A potential entrant, denoted E, faces lower marginal costs of
cE < cI but some ￿xed cost of entry F. We assume that E enters only if it makes positive
pro￿t. Each ￿rm I or E can sell by itself or through one or more downstream ￿rm (denoted D
if there is just one, or fD1;D2;:::g more generally) which are assumed to be all identical (all
with zero costs other than those arising from contracts, and all adding no additional value).3
Whichever ￿rm sets the lower price obtains the entire market demand at that price. If ￿rms
set the same price, we assume that there is some exogenous pro￿t-sharing rule to ensure
equilibria are well de￿ned (for example, the ￿rm facing the lower marginal cost obtains the
entire market).
Market demand Q(P); where P is the market price, is assumed to be continuous, non-
negative and decreasing in price. We assume that the revenue function R(Q) = P (Q)Q is
strictly concave in Q. The inverse demand function is denoted P (Q). The monopoly price
given any constant marginal cost w is denoted
PM (w) = argmax
P
(P ￿ w)Q(P):
For notational convenience, de￿ne QM (w) = Q(PM (w)). The incumbent￿ s monopoly
price and quantity are de￿ned as PM = PM (cI) and QM = QM (cI), with corresponding
monopoly pro￿t ￿M = (PM ￿ cI)QM. Assume P (0) > cI which ensures that if the in-
cumbent is a monopolist it will produce a positive output (and so can obtain a positive
pro￿t).
Our ￿rst key assumption is that the ￿xed cost of entry is not too large.
A1. F satis￿es
0 ￿ F < (cI ￿ cE)Q(cI): (1)
If the cost of entry is too large, i.e. when F ￿ (cI ￿ cE)Q(cI); then I will be able to
deter entry by competing directly with E: Thus, (1) allows us to consider the interesting
case when it will always be pro￿table for E to enter if it competes directly with I.
3This assumption enables us to avoid the di¢ cult equilibrium existence problems that otherwise arise
when general multilateral contracting is allowed between upstream and downstream ￿rms (see Mikl￿s-Thal
et al. 2010).
4The next essential assumption states that the entrant is not too e¢ cient.
A2. PM (cE) > cI and
￿M = (PM ￿ cI)QM > (cI ￿ cE)Q(cI) ￿ F: (2)
The ￿rst part of A2 states that the entrant￿ s cost advantage is not drastic. The second
part states that its e¢ ciency pro￿t (cI￿cE)Q(cI)￿F, the pro￿t E obtains when it competes
directly with I (after taking into account its entry cost), is less than the monopoly pro￿t.
In Section 4 we show both assumptions are needed for entry deterrence.
The timing of the game is as follows:
￿ Stage 1 (Incumbent￿ s contracting) I o⁄ers a contract (or contracts) to one or more
downstream ￿rms, which accept or not.
￿ Stage 2 (Entry) After observing I￿ s contract(s) and the acceptance decisions, E can
decide whether to enter the market (incurring the cost F).
￿ Stage 3 (Post-entry contracting / renegotiation) After observing whether E enters or
not, I (and E if it enters) can simultaneously negotiate contracts with (any) down-
stream ￿rms, or in the case of I; renegotiate its contract with downstream ￿rms, if
any.
￿ Stage 4 (Market competition) In the last stage all ￿nal contracts are observed and all
￿rms (if they wish) set prices, and the terms of contracts are executed.
Our purpose is to investigate the possibility of entry deterrence using delegation under
plausible and broad assumptions regarding exclusivity, commitment and renegotiation. The
equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. We assume I and E can commit to their vertical
contracts whereas downstream ￿rms cannot. For example, we allow that downstream ￿rm
D can walk away from any contract which it ￿nds unpro￿table ex-post, i.e., after observing
entry and even after observing the rival￿ s contract, by not buying anything from I and not
paying anything to I. Our set-up allows I and E to sell to the consumers directly even
5if they sign the contracts with some downstream ￿rms. We assume upstream ￿rms face
some arbitrarily small cost of contracting and/or renegotiating contracts, so that contracts
will only be o⁄ered or renegotiated if they strictly increase joint pro￿ts. In our set up I
and E cannot negotiate directly with each other, which typically would violate standard
antitrust laws on horizontal agreements. We start with the assumption that I cannot write
an exclusive contract in stage 1, but E (and I) can write exclusive contracts in stage 3.4 This
represents the most challenging setting in which to consider entry deterrence. In section 4
we extend the analysis to settings in which either exclusive deals cannot be written at any
stage or can be written by I in stage 1, showing how these make entry deterrence even more
pro￿table for the incumbent.
Contract space. The feasible contracts depend only on the quantity downstream ￿rms
buy from respective upstream ￿rms. Apart from E￿ s possible entry, this is the only thing I
can directly observe. If we allow contracts that depend explicitly on E￿ s entry decision, i.e.,
to be entry contingent, then as Fershtman, Judd and Kalai (1991) proved, any individually
rational outcome can be implemented. However, the contracts they consider will generally
not be renegotiation proof after entry. Moreover, making wholesale prices an explicit function
of whether the rival enters may violate antitrust law. One of the points of our paper is to
show such explicit dependence on entry is not necessary to deter entry.
We consider the contract space T which consists of contracts T (Q) = L+W (Q); where
W(Q) is a marginal price schedule, paid when Q > 0; and L 2 R is a possible lump-sum
payment. We require only that W (Q) are lower-semicontinuous functions, which allows us
to consider discontinuities in W(Q). A lump-sum payment L is a ￿xed payment paid in stage
4, which can depend on whether the downstream ￿rm buys a strictly positive quantity (an
optional payment) or which can be a non-avoidable payment paid irrespective of the quantity
the downstream ￿rm actually buys. We allow for a negative payment or allowance L < 0,
known as a slotting allowance in the literature (see Foros and Kind, 2008). We also allow for
free-disposal, that the downstream ￿rm may buy a small quantity from the upstream ￿rm
4The results do not depend on whether I can write exclusive contracts in stage 3.
6and freely dispose it. This makes the above two types of lump-sum payment equivalent in
our context.5
Our set-up allows for I to o⁄er a vector of contracts TI to some subset of downstream
￿rms. Given the e¢ ciency of the entrant, an optimal contract must deter entry.
De￿nition: An optimal contract TI is a (vector) contract which leads to the highest
payo⁄ for the incumbent among the class of contracts T .
An optimal contract can be a very complicated function from T . An important focus of
our analysis will be to ￿nd the simplest optimal contract by using simple piece-wise linear
marginal price schedules. The class TA of all-units contracts consists of contracts in which
marginal prices change at each increment, but the new marginal price applies to all units
purchased rather than just marginal units. The widely used all-units quantity discounting
contracts are just a special case of such contracts in which the marginal price declines at each
increment.6 Formally, the n￿part contract T (Q) = L + W(Q;w;S) 2 T
(n)
A is characterized
by the lump-sum fee L 6= 0; the vector of marginal prices w = (w1;w2;:::;wn￿1) and the
vector of price-breaks S = (S1;S2;:::;Sn￿1); where S1 = 0; such that T (Q) = L + wiQ if
Q 2 [Si;Si+1). Note that two-part contract T (Q) = F + wQ; where F > 0 is a ￿xed fee,
is also a special case of the class of contracts we consider. For purposes of consistency with
the literature we de￿ne all-units contracts with L = 0 and the vector of marginal prices
w = (w1;w2;:::;wn￿1) as n ￿ 1￿ part contracts.
3 Optimal contract
We de￿ne two parameters P and r which are instrumental in constructing an optimal con-
tract. The ￿rst parameter is the E￿ s break-even price P de￿ned by
P = minfP such that (P ￿ cE)Q(P) = Fg: (3)
5The other possibility, that L is an up-front fee paid at stage 1 will be discussed in Section 4.
6In Section 4 we show a similar analysis can be done with incremental-unit contracts in which the
marginal price applies only to the incremental units at each step. Incremental-units and all-units contracts
are discussed in Munson and Rosenblatt (1998) and Kolay et al. (2004).
7By assumption A1 this P exists and satis￿es cE < P < cI. Indeed (1) implies (P ￿ cE)Q(P) >
F when P = cI and (P ￿ cE)Q(P) < F when P = cE: Note also that since P(cE) < P(cI) =
PM and cI < P(cE) by A2, we have P < PM: The second parameter r; the entrant￿ s e¢ ciency
pro￿t, is de￿ned by
r = (cI ￿ cE)Q(cI) ￿ F: (4)
By (1), r > 0:
Initially, we assume that the market revenue function is non-decreasing at E￿ s break-even
price. This is always true for constant elasticity and logit demand where the revenue function
R(Q) is always increasing in Q, but also for linear and exponential demand speci￿cations
provided the price elasticity of the market demand Q(P) is greater than unity (in magnitude)
at Q(P)). In Section 4 we will discuss how to modify I0s optimal contract when this condition
does not hold.
Our goal is to ￿nd the simplest contract from the set T
(n)
A (i.e. with minimal n) which is
optimal among all contracts from T: It is useful to point out that by restricting to a simple
linear contract, the incumbent cannot prevent entry. Indeed, to cover its costs for any level
of sales, I must set its marginal price at or above cI if it contracts with downstream ￿rm(s)
and its price at or above cI if it sells directly. E can always propose to D a slightly lower
marginal price (if necessary), or sell directly to the market for a price less thancI, so that
given (1), it will pro￿tably take the whole market.
The next proposition characterizes the speci￿c three-part contract that we claim is opti-
mal.
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal all-units three-part contract TI = L+W(Q;w;S) 2
T
(3)
A that exhibits quantity discounting and such that (a) L < 0; (b) the incumbent￿ s pro￿t is
￿M ￿ r; (c) the lowest marginal wholesale price is below the incumbent￿ s marginal cost.
Proof. The proof is by construction. I o⁄ers a single downstream ￿rm D the contract
TI(Q) = L + W(Q;w;S); where w = (PM;P); S = (0;Q(P)) and L = ￿r. The contract is
depicted in Figure 1.
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This contract has two marginal wholesale prices PM and P, which play the role of linear
costs for D: A lump-sump payment r is paid to D in stage 4.
Assume ￿rst that D accepts TI(Q) and does not renegotiate with I: Also assume E
enters in stage 2. In a market subgame in stage 4, D competes with I;E; and, possibly with
other downstream ￿rms that E contracts with. If in stage 3, the entrant does not contract
with downstream ￿rms then in stage 4 it competes directly with D: Consider an equilibrium
(possibly involving mixed strategies) in this subgame.7 Denote by Pl (P 0
l) the lower bound
of retail prices chosen with positive probability by D (E). Assume ￿rst that P 0
l > P. Then
7Since we allow for lower-semicontinuous contracts we cannot guarantee the existence of pure equilibrium
in pricing subgame. However, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium (Reny, 1999). Indeed, a mixed
strategy equilibrium exists for any ￿nal subgame (in normal form) if its mixed extension is payo⁄ secure and
reciprocally upper-semicontinuous. The Bertrand game is payo⁄ secure (Reny, 1999). A su¢ cient condition
for the mixed extension of a game to be reciprocally upper semi-continuous is that the sum of pro￿ts for
the original game is upper semi-continuous. This is true for all subgames since ￿i + ￿i = R(qi) ￿ ciqi; for
i = I;E. Finally, the strategy spaces have to be compact sets. We do not require that the prices are bounded.
However, since I competes in stage 4 in entry subgame we can restrict to prices in the interval [0;cI].
9D can obtain a strictly positive pro￿t by deviating to the pure strategy PD = P 0
l ￿ " for
" > 0 such that PD > P and E sells nothing. Thus, in the market subgame equilibrium, it
must be that P 0
l ￿ P: Then if the price set by E is equal to P 0
l, given (3) the expected pro￿t
of E cannot be greater than F. Since in a mixed strategy equilibrium the expected pro￿t for
E must be the same for all prices played with positive probability, the expected pro￿t of E
across all prices it randomizes over cannot be larger than F. It will therefore not want to
enter.
Assume now E contracts with some downstream ￿rms D1;D2;:::;Dn in stage 3 (other
than D) and in the following market equilibrium (possibly involving mixed strategies) the
joint payo⁄of E and D1;D2;:::;Dn is greater than F. Consider the following deviation of E
(in stage 3). E does not contract with any downstream ￿rm in stage 3. Instead, E replicates
the outcome of the original strategy pro￿le by playing the minimum price that would have
arisen for each possible realization of the mixed strategies adopted by E;D1;D2;:::;Dn with
adjusted probabilities.8 From I and D￿ s perspective nothing has changed. Facing such a
strategy of E in stage 4, the best D and I can do is to follow their original equilibrium
strategies. It is clear that with this deviation the expected pro￿t of E in stage 4 is the same
as the joint payo⁄ of E and D1;D2;:::;Dn from the original strategy pro￿le. However, E is
strictly better o⁄ since it saves on the costs of contracting.
In the above entry analysis we did not consider the possibility E contracts with D. We
now show this is not part of any equilibrium. Assume that in stage 3 E has entered and that
it contracts with D. Then in stage 4, the equilibrium price cannot be greater or equal to cI
(given that I competes in stage 4). By A2 and concavity of the revenue function, we have
max
Q￿Q(cI)
(R(Q) ￿ cEQ ￿ F) = r;
and Q(cI) = argmaxQ￿Q(cI) (R(Q) ￿ cEQ ￿ F). Thus, the maximum that E can promise to
D is r which leads by (4) to a pro￿t less than or equal to F. Therefore, given the contract
8Any realization of the n + 1 ￿rms￿mixed strategies will be a n + 1 ￿ tuple of prices. For each possible
realization, E plays the minimum of these prices with a probability equal to the product of all probabilities
for the prices in this n + 1 ￿ tuple.
10TI, the entrant cannot cover its ￿xed costs.
We now show that I and D do not renegotiate the contract TI in stage 3. In case entry
occurs, the cost of entry F is sunk and E is ready to price down to its marginal cost cE:
Since P > cE; in equilibrium E must take the whole market. In this case, the joint pro￿t
of the pair (I;D) in this subgame is zero. Any re-contracting between I and D will lead
to a loss either to I or to D or to both. I and D also do not renegotiate in stage 3 in the
absence of entry. Any contract should leave D at least r: In this case the maximum that I
can obtain is ￿M ￿r: Given the (arbitrarily small) cost of re-contracting, I is strictly worse
o⁄ renegotiating its contract.
We established that given the acceptance of TI in stage 1, it is not pro￿table for E to
enter in stage 2. Consider the market subgame where there is no entry, I and D do not
renegotiate their contract in stage 3, and I does not contract with other downstream ￿rms
in stage 3. It must be that the equilibrium retail price is PM. Consider the two possibilities.
(a) If D sets the equilibrium price (or I and D share the market) then it must be that
PD ￿ PI. We show in this case that PD = PM: To see why note that if PD > PM then I has
a pro￿table deviation, to set the price PM which is pro￿table given I otherwise obtains the
same monopoly wholesale price but sells fewer units. If PD < PM; then D makes a loss from
selling units below its wholesale cost PM, and has a pro￿table deviation to set the price PM.
(b) If I sets the equilibrium price PI then it must be that PI < PD. We show in this
case that PI = PM. To see why note that if PI > PM then D has a pro￿table deviation,
PD = PI ￿ " > PM. If PI < PM then I can increase PI slightly and increase its pro￿t since
it will still take the whole market. Thus, in both cases the joint pro￿t of the pair (I;D) is
￿M.
To show that TI is optimal for I assume that there exists an equilibrium with I o⁄ering
the vector (T1;:::;Tn); TI(Q) = Li + Wi(Q); to downstream ￿rms (D1;:::;Dn) such that I
obtains strictly more than ￿M ￿r: This implies the downstream ￿rms in total obtain (when
there is no entry)
Pn
i=1 ￿i < r; where ￿i ￿ ￿Li is Di￿ s pro￿t when there is no entry. Suppose




11and the marginal price wi > PM, for " > 0 such that
Pn
i=1 ￿i + " < r: Since Di obtains
￿Li under the contract TI in case of entry, it will accept T 0
i: With this deviation, E and the
downstream ￿rms (D1;:::;Dn) are competing directly with I: By (4), entry will be pro￿table
for E. Therefore, the minimum rent which downstream ￿rms can obtain is r:
Finally, note that since ￿L = r is an allowance paid irrespective of D￿ s production, I
cannot obtain more than ￿M ￿r by contracting with other downstream ￿rms in stage 3.
There are three instruments in the optimal contract TI: two marginal prices (PM;P) and
the rent paid to D: No instrument in the contract is redundant. The lower marginal price
of P < cI; that applies if at least Q(P) units are purchased, ensures that E does not ￿nd
entry pro￿table when it competes by itself or through any other downstream ￿rm(s) di⁄erent
from D. The ￿rst marginal price of PM ensures the optimal choice of quantity and price in
equilibrium when there is no entry. Finally, to avoid the possibility of contracting with the
entrant, D has to obtain a positive rent r:
In Proposition 1 we constructed one particular optimal contract. The next proposition
establishes that any optimal contract from the contract space T has similar properties. In
particular, the optimal contract will involve only one downstream ￿rm. This ￿rm will be
paid a strictly positive allowance.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract TI involves I only contracting with one downstream
￿rm and has a form TI = L + W(Q); with a strictly positive allowance L = ￿r;W(Q) ￿
R(Q); for Q ￿ Q(cI) and W(Q(P)) = R(Q(P)):
Proof. Suppose that I proposes contracts fT1;:::;Tng; Ti (Q) = Li + Wi (Q) 2 T to n
downstream ￿rms fD1;:::;Dng in stage 1, where Li is not restricted to be negative. Assume
that these contracts are all accepted by respective downstream ￿rms. Consider the subgame
in stage 4 with no entry. By Proposition 1, for these contracts to be optimal the joint pro￿t
of I and active downstream ￿rms in stage 4 should be equal to ￿M: This implies the market
price PM and quantity QM: The main question is therefore, can I decrease the total rent
o⁄ered to downstream ￿rms by contracting with several downstream ￿rms?
12Consider an equilibrium (PI;PD1;:::;PDn) of the game in stage 4, PM ￿ P 2 fPI;PD1;:::;PDng.




QM ; is the average price paid at
QM by Di: There are three possibilities: (i) I sets the ￿nal price PM = PI < PDi;i = 1;:::;n;
(ii) Di (possibly a subset of fD1;:::;Dng) sets the ￿nal price PM = PDi < PI; (iii) I and Di
(possibly a subset of fD1;:::;Dng) share the market with PM = PI = PDi. Suppose that for
some i we have Li > 0: If Di does not set the equilibrium price, PM < PDi; then ￿Di = ￿Li <
0 and Di does not accept the contract in stage 1. If Di sets the equilibrium price (or Di shares
the market with I or other downstream ￿rms), PM = PDi ￿ PI: In this case if PM ￿ w￿
i;
then Ti(QM) = Li + w￿
iQM > R(QM) = PMQM and thus ￿Di = R(QM) ￿ Ti(QM) < 0: If
PM > w￿
i; then I has a pro￿table deviation, PI = PM ￿": With this deviation, I obtains the
whole market and its pro￿t (net of
Pn
i=1 Li) is (PM ￿ " ￿ cI)Q(PM ￿") which is larger than
WI(QM) ￿ cIQM = (w￿ ￿ cI)Q(PM) for " small enough. Thus, we have Li ￿ 0 for all i.
Note that (a) if Di sets the equilibrium price or when Di and I share the market (possibly
with other downstream ￿rms), then w￿
i = PM; and Li = Ti(Q￿) ￿ P ￿Q￿ = ￿￿Di; (b) if I
sets the equilibrium price, then w￿
i ￿ PM for all i = 1;:::;n; and Di obtains ￿Li for all i =
1;:::;n. Indeed assume that PM = PDi ￿ PI. If PM > w￿
i then I has a pro￿table deviation,
PI = PDi ￿ ". If PM < w￿
i; then Di has a pro￿table deviation, PDi ￿ PI: In this case Di
sells nothing (or shares the market) and obtains ￿Li (or ￿Li+￿(R(QM) ￿ cIQM) for some
0 < ￿ < 1) which is larger than R(QM) ￿ Ti(QM) = (PM ￿ w￿
i)QM ￿ Li. Therefore, in this
case, w￿
i = PM: Since PM = w￿
i, we have Li = Ti(QM)￿w￿
iQM = Ti(QM)￿PMQM = ￿￿Di.
Assume that PM = PI < PDi: If PM > w￿
i then Di has a pro￿table deviation, PDi = PI ￿ ".
Therefore, it must be that PM ￿ w￿
i:
In both cases (a) and (b) the downstream ￿rms contracting with I receive their pro￿t
only through allowances: ￿Li = ￿Di. Therefore if ￿
Pn
i=1 Li < r; then E proposes to each
Di the contracts T 0
i = Li ￿ "=n + Wi; where " > 0 is such that ￿
Pn
i=1 Li + " < r: The
downstream ￿rms accept these contracts. Thus, the total rent paid to the downstream ￿rms
must be r to ensure that E cannot pro￿tably contract with downstream ￿rms in this way.
E cannot o⁄er contracts to only some of the n downstream ￿rms. As soon as there exists
13one downstream ￿rm who is ready to price down to P, the entry will not be pro￿table.
Given the arbitrarily small cost of contracting, dealing with several downstream ￿rms
lead to higher cost of contracting than dealing with only one downstream ￿rm given that
Proposition 1 guarantees the same ￿nal allocation for I: Note ￿nally that since the down-
stream ￿rm obtains it pro￿t only through the allowance it must be that W(Q) ￿ R(Q); for
Q ￿ Q(cI): The condition W(Q(P)) = R(Q(P)) is therefore necessary for the optimality of
TI.
Note that the case when I rather than D sets the equilibrium price, as described in the
proof of Proposition 2, can indeed be implemented. To do this I proposes a contract such
that D is inactive in the absence of entry. The sole purpose of such contract is to deter entry
and D only plays an active role in constraining E￿ s price when entry occurs. For example,
the ￿rst part of the piece-wise linear contract can be steep enough so that D does not ￿nd it
pro￿table to buy some positive quantity from I in the absence of entry. In this case I acts as
a monopolist and sets the ￿nal monopoly price. D however, still faces low wholesale prices
for su¢ ciently large quantities and enjoys the rent r > 0 necessary to keep out the entrant.
Thus, such contracts still work in essentially the same way as the contract in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 proposes an optimal three-part contract with an allowance. It is easy to
see that an optimal contract to one downstream ￿rm cannot have lower dimensionality than
that of a three-part contract.
Proposition 3 For any optimal contract TI 2 T
(n)
A it must be that n ￿ 3.
Proof. By Proposition 2 we have L < 0 and w￿ ￿ P ￿ = PM: Since in case of entry the
marginal wholesale price has to be below or equal to P, the optimal all-units contract must
have at least two marginal prices.
4 Extensions
In this section, we discuss what happens when some of our assumptions are relaxed or
modi￿ed from the above benchmark model.
14The e¢ ciency of the entrant: If the e¢ ciency pro￿t of E is larger than the monopoly
pro￿t of I, then the rent r in Proposition 1 will be greater than ￿M: I will not be able to
prevent D from contracting with E and entry will occur. Thus, it is critical for our result
that the cost advantage of the entrant cannot be too large. Similarly, the assumption that
the cost advantage of the entrant be non-drastic is also critical. If the entrant has a drastic
cost advantage, this means the rent that I must o⁄er D to prevent it contracting with E
will be equal to (pM (cE) ￿ cE)Q(pM (cE)) since this is the amount E can o⁄er D in stage
3. Since this is necessarily more than ￿M, such entry cannot be deterred.
The entrant cannot write exclusive contracts: In order to consider the most di¢ cult
environment in which to deter entry, in our benchmark setting we assumed that E could
write exclusive contracts upon entry. Given E is more e¢ cient, this gave it considerable
power in attracting D in stage 3 and meant that I had to o⁄er D a non-trivial rent r to
prevent entry. If instead E cannot write exclusive deals in stage 3, then E will no longer obtain
the same advantage from attracting D. The three-part contract TI described in Proposition
1 will continue to deter entry. Moreover, I can do better, o⁄ering D an arbitrarily small
allowance ￿L = " > 0. The downstream ￿rm D will always accept such a contract since if
it does not, then E will enter and D will be left with no surplus. Due to the structure of the
contract TI, D will continue to constrain the pricing decision of E, in this case even if E also
contracts with D. In particular, E cannot sell anything at a price above P if it competes
with D in the retail market (as before). If instead it sells through D it will still not be able
to obtain a price above P given that D can buy at this price through I and since E is willing
to undercut any retail price of D that exceeds the wholesale price it charges D. Thus, entry
is again deterred, with I now obtaining almost full monopoly pro￿ts.
The incumbent can write an exclusive contract: In the main section, E is allowed to
contract with D in stage 3 if E decides to enter. This possibility leads to a strictly positive
allowance for D and less than monopoly pro￿t for I. Suppose now I can o⁄er an exclusive
contract in stage 1 to prevent such contracting between E and D in stage 3. The timing of
the game is unchanged except that in stage 3 the entrant cannot contract with D; i.e., there
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is exclusive dealing between I and D:
Proposition 4 Under exclusive contracting the incumbent will obtain full monopoly pro￿ts,
deterring entry in the process. This can be achieved by using a two-part all-units contract.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 1. I o⁄ers D the contract TI(Q) = L +
W(Q;w;S); where w = (PM;P); S = (0;Q(P)) and L = 0. This contract is depicted on
Figure 2.
Note also that even when D is the only downstream ￿rm available to upstream ￿rms, it
is still optimal for D to accept the exclusive contract proposed by the incumbent. Suppose
D decides to reject this contract and contract with E in order to try to extract some rent
from it. This will not work since in stage 3 when entry occurs, D does not bring any value
to the upstream ￿rms given that they can both sell directly to consumers (or through other
identical retailers).
The ￿disposal-rent￿ : When the revenue function is strictly decreasing at Q(P), I must
leave some additional rent to D. If there is no entry (as will be the case in equilibrium), D can
16Q
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buy Q(P) units for TI (Q(P)) but then sell fewer units so as to obtain a higher revenue by
setting a higher retail price. Indeed since W (Q(P)) = R(Q(P)) and R(Q(P)) < R(QR),
where QR = argmaxQ R(Q); D freely disposes Q(P)￿QR additional units and obtains the
extra pro￿t R(QR) ￿ R(Q(P)).
To avoid D ordering Q(P) units in equilibrium, I will o⁄er D an extra rent rd = R(QR)￿
R(Q(P)). We call this rent the ￿disposal-rent￿ , the extra-rent D can obtain in equilibrium
given it can freely dispose of the good. The same amount has to be added to the allowance
and rent D obtains when there is no entry. Thus, the incumbent may still deter entry, but
its pro￿t will be reduced by the size of this rent.9 The resulting total rent that must be left
to D is r0 = r + rd: The optimal contract for the benchmark case is depicted on Figure 3.
Upfront fees: Upfront fees can make it easier for I to deter entry since they provide a
further ￿rst-mover advantage to I. In particular, they provide a mechanism for I to capture
any rent r (or r+rd) that must be o⁄ered to D in stage 4. Thus, they allow I to capture the
full monopoly pro￿t ￿M. In case there is entry and D does face competition, this upfront
9As a result, the assumption in A2 needs to be tightened so that ￿M > (cI ￿ cE)Q(cI) ￿ F + rd.
17fee is a sunk cost for D, and does not a⁄ect the incentives facing D to undercut competitors
as is required to prevent entry. This also means, with upfront fees, D may regret signing its
contract with I, in the o⁄-equilibrium case that there is entry. Other than this di⁄erence,
the existing optimal contract continues to work as in Proposition 1.
Incremental-units quantity discounting: Proposition 1 shows that all-units quantity dis-
counting can be used by the incumbent to deter entry. We note that another commonly
analyzed type of piece-wise linear contract achieves the same goal. This type of contract is
associated with incremental-units quantity discounting, which is a continuous, block declin-
ing contract, in which the marginal prices decline at each increment. The n￿part con-
tract T (Q) = L + W(Q;w;S) 2 T
(n)
I is characterized by the vector of marginal prices
w = (w1;w2;:::;wn￿1); a lump-sum fee L 6= 0 and the vector of price-breaks (S1;S2;:::;Sn￿1)
such that TI (QI) = L+w1QI if QI < S1; TI (QI) = L+w1S1+w2 (QI ￿ S1) if QI 2 [S1;S2)
etc. Incremental-units quantity discounting involves the declining marginal prices: w1 >
w2 > ::: > wn￿1.
The next proposition is a counter-part of Proposition 1. It shows that the incumbent
can optimally deter entry by using a three-part block declining contract which exhibits
incremental-units quantity discounting.
Proposition 5 There exists an optimal incremental-units three-part contract TI = L +
W(Q;w;S) 2 T
(3)
I such that (a) L < 0; (b) the incumbent￿ s pro￿t is ￿M ￿ r; (c) the lowest
marginal wholesale price is below the incumbent￿ s marginal cost.
The contract is depicted in Figure 4.
The pro￿t obtained is identical to that obtained with the three-part all-units contract
characterized in Proposition 1. The contract has the form TI(Q) = L + W(Q;w;S); where
w = (PM;R0(Q(P))); S = (0;
(P￿R0(Q(P)))
PM￿R0(Q(P))Q(P)) and L = ￿r.
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5 Conclusions
The key new idea developed in this paper is that commonly used forms of contracts involving
quantity discounting can have entry deterring e⁄ects. An upstream incumbent can use
such contracts to commit its downstream distributor to be more aggressive in the face of
competition. For low levels of purchases, the downstream ￿rm purchases at a wholesale
price set above the incumbent￿ s marginal cost, thereby providing a way for the incumbent to
extract the downstream ￿rm pro￿t. For purchases beyond some higher level, the downstream
￿rm purchases at a wholesale price set below the incumbent￿ s marginal cost, thereby ensuring
that in the face of competition, the downstream ￿rm will want to compete aggressively, in
such a way that the rival will not want to enter. A third instrument in the optimal contract
includes an allowance paid to the downstream ￿rm. This rent ensures that the downstream
￿rm is not willing to contract with the rival instead, in case it enters. The amount of rent that
needs to be paid is limited to the entrant￿ s e¢ ciency pro￿t, given both ￿rms can always sell to
19￿nal consumers directly. The proposed optimal contract is also renegotiation-proof, thereby
ensuring the incumbent can pro￿tably deter entry even when its contract can be renegotiated
for an arbitrarily small cost. Thus, we provide a new explanation of how e¢ cient entry can
be deterred based on vertical contracts, one that avoids making the usual assumptions such
as asymmetric information, exclusivity or commitment without renegotiation.
The benchmark model we have provided can be extended in numerous directions. Several
natural modi￿cations have been analyzed in this paper, including to the cases in which the
incumbent can use exclusive deals or upfront fees. In the former case, we showed exclusive
deals eliminate the rent that has to be paid to the downstream ￿rm so the incumbent can
obtain full monopoly pro￿t. In the latter case, the rent must still be paid ex-post but it can
be fully extracted in the initial contract through an upfront fee.
One can think of the entry deterring vertical contracts we consider as a type of vertical
limit pricing or predation given that the incumbent o⁄ers to sell below its own cost, for
su¢ ciently large purchases. This suggests from a policy viewpoint, our theory supports the
use of a predatory pricing standard for dealing with wholesale price discounts. In our theory,
there are two testable features of entry-deterring contracts: marginal wholesale prices must
fall below a ￿rm￿ s own marginal cost for su¢ ciently large quantities and it must either rely
on allowances paid to the downstream ￿rm or exclusive contracts.
An interesting direction for future research would be to explore a dynamic version of this
vertical limit pricing story, in which downstream ￿rms make a sequence of purchase decisions.
The type of quantity discounting contracts we propose may be used to engage in traditional
predation, but in a less obvious way. Thus, for instance, an incumbent manufacturer that
wanted to build a reputation for toughness (along the lines of Kreps and Wilson, 1982),
can use the seemingly standard quantity discounting contract we propose, which ensures
its retailer only ￿￿ghts￿when necessary, while reducing the likelihood of antitrust action
that might otherwise result from shifting to a more aggressive pricing schedule (involving
a marginal price below cost) in the face of entry. The incumbent￿ s incentive to keep a
reputation for toughness in a multiperiod or multiple-entrant environment could also provide
20an additional reason why the incumbent may not want to renegotiate its contract in case of
entry.
Finally, related to this last point, a very natural extension of the established literature
would be to modify the standard signaling and reputation stories of limit pricing and preda-
tion based on asymmetric information so as to incorporate the fact that the incumbent sells
to retailers rather than ￿nal consumers. In such a theory, a low wholesale price might signal
that the incumbent has low cost, thereby deterring entry. However, an aggressive wholesale
pricing schedule can also have a direct entry deterring e⁄ect, in addition to its signaling
e⁄ect, along the lines considered in this paper. Moreover, in such a setting, the nature of
limit pricing and predation could be quite di⁄erent if rivals only observe retail prices rather
than wholesale contracts. In other words, the analysis of signaling and reputation building
in vertical settings is likely to make for interesting future research.
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